Finding the Pareto Optimal Equitable Allocation of Homogeneous Divisible Goods Among Three Players by Dall'Aglio, Marco et al.
O P E R A T I O N S  R E S E A R C H  A N D  D E C I S I O N S 
No. 3 2017 
DOI: 10.5277/ord170303 
Marco DALL’AGLIO1 
Camilla DI LUCA1 
Lucia MILONE1 
FINDING THE PARETO OPTIMAL EQUITABLE ALLOCATION 
OF HOMOGENEOUS DIVISIBLE GOODS AMONG THREE PLAYERS 
We consider the allocation of a finite number of homogeneous divisible items among three players. 
Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we develop a simple 
algorithm that returns a Pareto optimal and equitable allocation. This is based on the tight relationship 
between two geometric objects of fair division: The Individual Pieces Set (IPS) and the Radon–Ny-
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1. Introduction 
In this article we study a fair division problem: how to optimally allocate a (finite) 
number of items to three persons, usually denoted players or agents in the economic 
literature, with heterogeneous preferences. 
We will consider items which are attractive to the players, and are therefore called 
goods. They are completely divisible: any good can be partitioned in any proportion 
among the three players, and each of them will enjoy a utility proportional to the fraction 
received. This is typically true, for instance, with edible goods. 
When indivisible goods are present, all of the possible arrangements may prove un-
satisfactory for one or more agents (consider, for instance, the case of two goods being 
assigned to three players). Notice, however, that players could overcome this problem 
by assigning an item according to a lottery with the probability of winning the good 
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being proportional to the fraction proposed by a procedure that treats the good as divisi-
ble. We refer to Demko and Hill [12] for further details. As an alternative, players may 
use monetary side payments to simulate a split. 
The assumptions and the model that we are considering are the same as under which 
Brams and Taylor devised the Adjusted Winner (AW) procedure, which works for two 
players. This procedure, described in [7] and [8], returns an allocation with many ap-
pealing properties: i) it is (strongly) Pareto-optimal: neither player can improve his wel-
fare without worsening that of the other player; ii) it is equitable: in their own evalua-
tions, the two players enjoy the same amount of utility, and iii) it is envy-free: neither 
player prefers the allotment of the other according to the players’ preferences. 
Moving from a two-player setting to a three-player one is not an easy extension. 
Dall’Aglio and Hill [11] presented a series of examples, with three or more players, 
where the three properties ensured by the AW procedure could not coexist2. This diffi-
culty was later noted more explicitly by Brams et al. [6]. 
Since Pareto optimality is an essential requirement, it is necessary to choose be-
tween equitability and freedom from envy. Olvera-López and Sánchez-Sánchez [15], 
adopted a linear programming approach to find the maxmin-optimal allocation, which, 
under the hypothesis of Mutual Absolutely Continuous (MAC) utilities is also Pareto- 
-optimal and equitable for a finite number of players. This is done by transforming the 
fair division problem into an optimization problem over a bipartite graph, with the nodes 
on one side representing players, and the nodes on the other side denoting goods. 
Here we propose an alternative graph-based approach, with the graph originating 
from the tight relationship between two geometric objects, the Individual Pieces Set 
(IPS) and the Radon–Nikodym Set (RNS) specifically introduced to deal with problems 
in fair division. This graph is obtained by placing the objects in the  RNS and by con-
sidering the objects and the intersections between lines joining these objects to the ver-
tices of the RNS as nodes, and these lines as edges. 
While we do not achieve the generality of the previous approach, we believe that 
this approach is more intuitive. In fact, once the objects are plotted on the RNS, every 
Pareto-optimal allocation can be visualized immediately. The optimal allocation is 
sought from among all these allocations by moving from one node of the graph to an 
adjacent one, until a local optimum is found. This is the global optimal allocation for 
the problem. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section 3, 
we introduce the reader to the geometry of efficient fair division (named after [2]) and 
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describe the graph on which we construct the optimization problem. In Section 4, we 
describe the algorithm and prove its convergence. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The problem 
Let M = {1, 2, ..., m}, with m  be the set of divisible and homogeneous objects 
to be allocated among three players. The set of players will be usually denoted as 
 1, 2, 3N   but the Roman numerals I, II and III will be employed in figures. 
We write the matrix of evaluations as ,[ ,]ij i N j Ma    where entry ija  describes the 
value that player i N  assigns to item .j M  We assume that utilities are 
Non-negative. All of the objects are goods: 
0 ,ija i N j M      
Linear. If player i gets a share   of item j and a share [0,1]kt   of item k she gets 
a total utility of .j ij k ikt a t a  
Normalized. The agents attach the same value to the whole bundle of goods: 
1,ij
j M
a i N

     
Let ,[ ] , 0, ,ij i N j M ijx x i N j M     X  be an allocation matrix, with 1,ij
i N
x


j M   and ,X   where  is the set of all possible allocation matrices. Let us label 
by X  any integer allocations where ˆ {0, 1}, ,ijx i N j M     and by   the set of 
such allocations. Define now, for any X  , 
1 2 3( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) with ( ) 1, 3, 2,i ij ij
j M
a a a a a a x i

  X X X X X   
The i-th component of this vector is the total value that player i derives from the 
given allocation X. 
We are going to search for an allocation *X  which simultaneously satisfies 
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(Strong) Pareto optimality (PO). There is no other allocation X   such that 
*( ) ( )i ia a X X  for all ,i N  with strict inequality for at least one player. 
Equitability (EQ). 
* * *
1 2 3( ) ( ) ( )a a a X X X  
The proposed allocation coincides with the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution [13, 14] 
for bargaining problems. Throughout the rest of the article, we make the following sim-
plifying assumption: 
Mutual absolute continuity (MAC). Each player assigns a positive value to every 
item, i.e., 
0 for any  and ij ea C i N j M     
When MAC holds, a PO-EQ allocation always exists. 
Theorem 1. (Corollary 5.8 in [9]). If the utility of all the players has a common 
support, i.e., a common set of goods with strictly positive utility for all the players, then 
the PO-EQ allocation coincides with the maxmin allocation, defined by 
 * argmax min ( )i N ia  XX X   
which exists for any instance of the problem. 
3. Geometrical framework 
We are now going to review two geometric structures that are useful for the analysis 
of PO and PO-EQ allocations. First of all, we characterize PO allocations. Let 2  be 
the two-dimensional simplex 
 32 1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) : 0, 1, 2, 3,  and 1ix x x x i x x x         
and let ri(A) be the relative interior of any subset A of an Euclidean space. In particular, 
 32 1 2 3 1 2 3ri( ) ( , , ) : 0, 1, 2, 3,  and 1ix x x x i x x x         
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Theorem 2. (Theorem 1 in [3], Proposition 4.3 in [9]). Under MAC, an allocation 
[ ]ikxX is PO iff, for some 1 2 3 2( , , ) ri( )       the following holds: For any 
k M  
 0 if  for any ,ik i ik j jkx a a i j N     (1) 
We denote by [ ]ikx X  any allocation satisfying (1). 
 3.1. The individual pieces set 
We consider the individual pieces set 3IPS   (see [2]), also known as the parti-
tion range, defined as follows 
 IPS ( ) :a X X   
Dall’Aglio et al. [10] have shown that 
    IPS conv ( ) :a X X    (2) 
The value of a PO-EQ allocation is given by the point of intersection between the 
egalitarian ray, i.e., the line of points whose coordinates are equal in 3  and the upper 
surface of the IPS denoted by the Pareto boundary, PB. Statement (2) shows that the PB 
is composed of faces. MAC implies that no Pareto face is parallel to any of the coordi-
nate axes3. 
If we consider the partition range from above, finding the PO-EQ allocation amounts 
to finding the face of the PB that contains the egalitarian ray (more than one face may 
be involved if the egalitarian ray “hits” an edge, or coincides with an integer alloca-
tion), and then finding the allocation on this Pareto face which yields the optimal value 
(Fig. 1a). 
Consider, for any 31 2 3( , , )x x x x    the normalizing operator 
31 2
1 2 3( ) , , with  ( )( ) ( ) ( )
xx xN x s x x x x
s x s x s x
        
 _________________________  
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for one player, the other players’ utilities cannot remain constant. The assumption of MAC is therefore 
incompatible with Pareto faces parallel to the axes. 
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and define the normalized Pareto boundary, NPB, as 
 NPB ( ) : PBN x x   
 
Fig. 1. In a), the PB set is indicated by the grey surface, while the white dot indicates 
the value of the PO-EQ allocation. In b), the same set seen from above yields the NPB set.  
The PO-EQ allocation is in the barycenter of the simplex 
In general, 2NPB   holds, but it can be easily shown that these two sets coincide 
when MAC holds. The Pareto faces partition the set NPB, and finding the PO-EQ allo-
cation amounts to finding the allocation corresponding to the centre (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) on 
the NPB (Fig. 1b). 
To find the PO-EQ allocations, we will employ the following result, which is valid 
for general fair division problems (any number of players, completely divisible and non-
homogeneous goods). 
Theorem 3. (Proposition 6.1 in [9]). Consider the following function g: 2 [0, 1]   
1 2 3 2( ) ( ) ( , , )i i
i N
g a       

   X  
with X  being the PO allocation associated to   according to (1). Then the hyperplane 
3
1 2 3( ) ( , , ) : ( )i i
i N
x x x x g  

       
supports IPS at the point 1 2 3( ( ), ( ), ( )),a a a  X X X  i.e., 
1 2 3 1 2 3( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) and ( ) ( , , ) IPSi i
i N
a a a y g y y y     

   X X X    
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The hyperplane ( )  intersects the egalitarian ray at the point ( )(1, 1, 1)g  . 
The function ( )g   is convex, and, for any of its minimizing points *  the hyper-
plane *( )  supports IPS at a set of points containing the PO-EQ allocation. 
An algorithm that returns the leximin allocation is described in [9]. This can be 
adapted to return the PO-EQ allocation in the present situation: 
1. Find *  an absolute minimum of g.  
2. Find the Pareto face corresponding to *( ) . 
3. Find the equitable allocation within the Pareto face. 
To fully adapt this algorithm to the present situation, we need to better characterize 
the Pareto faces. 
3.2. The Radon–Nykodim set 
Figure 1b shows that the  NPB can be represented as a 2-dimensional simplex. We 
will now consider another 2-dimensional simplex, introduced by Weller [16] and exten-
sively investigated by Barbanel [2] that enables us to represent the items, the efficient 
partitions and the faces of the PB into a single geometric figure. Following [2], we apply 
the Radon–Nikodyn set, RNS to define this new simplex. 
Each vertex of the RNS represents a player. We next plot the individual items onto 
the RNS by considering the normalized vectors of the evaluations of these items 
( )nj ja N a j M   
The normalized coordinates of all these objects are plotted on a 2-dimensional sim-
plex where each vertex represents a player. Under MAC 2ri( )nja   for each .j M  
Definition 1. For each point 1 2 3( , , ) RNS,      consider the lines joining   
to each vertex. We denote the half open segments on these lines from  to the opposite 
side of each vertex, with  excluded, disputing segments. 
Definition 2. For each ri(RNS)   we derive the following Pareto allocation rule 
based on , PAR( )  which delivers one or more PO allocations under MAC (see the-
orem 10.9 in [2]). The disputing segments of  divide the simplex into three parts, each 
being a neighbourhood of a vertex. The objects in each neighbourhood are assigned to 
the player associated to the corresponding vertex. Denote any such allocation as .X  In the 
case where the allocation is integer, we will use  .X  
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It is important to notice that this allocation rule may not be unique. In the case where 
an object lies on one of the disputing segments of , it can be considered to be on both 
sides of the segment, and therefore can be assigned to any of the corresponding players, 
or it can be split between these players. 
Every Pareto allocation lies on the upper border of the convex set IPS, and a hyper-
plane supports IPS at this point. A more precise account of the relationship between 
supporting hyperplanes and the Pareto allocation rule is given by the following result. 
Theorem 4. (Theorem 2 in [1]). Assume MAC. If, for any 1 2 3 2( , , ) ri( )x x x x   , 
we denote 
1 2 3
1 1 1RD( ) , ,x N
x x x
    
 
then, for any 2ri( )   the allocation X  satisfies PAR( )  with RD( ).   Con-
versely, for any RNS,   the allocation rule  X  supports IPS through the hyperplane 
H   with RD( ).   
When, given RNS,   one or more objects lie on disputing segments, the associ-
ated hyperplane supports all the corresponding integer allocations and their convex 
hulls. This fact plays a crucial role in how the Pareto faces are generated. 
Definition 3. For any item ,j K  we call the segments joining nja  to each of the 
three vertices supporting segments. Two items, ,j k K  are support independent, or  
s-independent, if neither nja , nor nka  lies on any of the supporting segments of the other 
item. In Figure 2, we illustrate the dividing and supporting segments of one or more items. 
 
Fig. 2. Supporting segments (solid lines) and disputing segments (dashed lines) of an item (a), 
two s-independent items (b), two dependent items (c) 
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In [10], it is shown (Proposition 2) that the supporting segments of two items inter-
sect exactly once if and only if the two items are s-independent. 
3.3. The Pareto boundary as a graph 
The items and the supporting line segments in the RNS fully define the faces of the 
NPB. In Dall’Aglio et al. [10] (Theorem 4 and the following considerations) it is shown 
that, for any RNS   that coincides with an item or is positioned at the intersection of 
two or more s-independent supporting line segments, PAR( )  defines a face on the 
Pareto border of the IPS, and therefore on the NPB. Conversely, each hyperplane ( )  
with 2ri( )   supporting a Pareto face on the IPS is such that ( )RD   coincides with 
an item in the RNS, or is positioned at the intersection of two s-independent supporting 
line segments. 
The RNS simplex can therefore be used to build a graph { , }V E  where each vertex 
v V  is a face on the Pareto surface, and two vertices iv  and jv  are connected by an arc4 
ije E  if and only if the corresponding faces are adjacent, i.e., they share a common edge. 
The construction of this graph is based on considering all the goods in RNS with their 
supporting line segments. The vertices V consist of all the points in the RNS coinciding 
with a good or with an intersection of supporting line segments. Two vertices ,i jv v V  
are connected by an arc ije E  whenever there is a supporting segment joining the two 
vertices, with no other vertex of V in between. 
In the same reference, [10] (Theorem 6), the authors show that, under MAC, two 
faces on the Pareto border of IPS are adjacent, i.e., they share a common line segment 
if and only if the corresponding vertices kv  and v  are joined by an arc in  . 
4. A simple algorithm 
We now consider a function : [0, 1]g RNS   defined for each RNS   as 
( ) ( ( ))g g RD   
This function is defined for each vertex of the graph ( ).g v  The following theorem 
shows that it suffices to check the value of g  on the face/vertices only. Moreover, the 
 _________________________  
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on the Pareto surface. 
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function g  inherits the convexity property of g, according to which it suffices to show 
that g  is a “local” minimum (i.e., a minimum w.r.t. the adjacent vertices) to ensure that 
it is a global optimum. 
Theorem 5. Under MAC, a face/vertex *v  containing the egalitarian ray has the fol-
lowing properties: 
 It is the global minimum for :g  
 *( ) ( ) for any g v g v v V    (3) 
 It suffices to show that it is a local minimum for ,g  i.e., 
 * *( ) ( ) for any  adjacent to g v g v v v    (4) 
Proof. 
 I. The PO-EQ allocation belongs to one or more Pareto faces. According to Theo-
rem 3 (iii), one of the minimizing arguments of g (and therefore of g ) will correspond 
to such a Pareto face. The corresponding vertex on the graph will be associated with the 
same absolute minimum. 
II. We need to prove two preliminary claims. 
We consider two hyperplanes: (face)  passing through a Pareto face, and (edge)  
passing through an edge of the face. Denote by (face)g  and (edge)g  the value of g corre-
sponding to (face)  and (edge),  respectively, and denote by ed  the line formed by the 
intersection of the two (non-parallel) hyperplanes containing this edge. Consider now the 
following projections onto the NPB, obtained by normalizing the points in geometrical 
objects: face ed eq, ,p p p  are the projections of the Pareto face, the line ed  and the bisec-
tor, respectively. We prove the following claims: 
 
Fig. 3. The two cases for claim 1 
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Claim 1a. If facep  and eqp  are on the same side of edp  (see Fig. 3, case 1a) then 
(edge) (face).g g  
Claim 1b. If facep  and eqp are on opposite sides of edp  (see Fig. 3, case 1b) then 
(edge) (face).g g  
Proof of claims 1a and 1b 
1a. Suppose (edge) (face)g g . Then the hyperplane (edge)  passes through the 
edge and (edge)(1, 1, 1)g  separating the IPS from the Pareto face and g(face)(1, 1, 1) 
(Fig. 4, Case 1a). This is a contradiction. 
1b. Suppose (edge) (face).g g  Then the hyperplane (edge)  passes through the 
edge and (edge)(1, 1, 1),g  separating the IPS from the Pareto face and g(face)(1, 1, 1) 
(Fig. 4, Case 1b). This is again a contradiction.  
 
Fig. 4. Proofs of claims 1a and 1b 
As a consequence of these claims, suppose that ( ) ( )g v g v    for two adjacent 
faces. Hence, projecting the Pareto face ,v  the line containing the edge and the bisector 
onto the NPB, the projected Pareto face and the projected bisector must lie on the same 
side of the projected line. 
Claim 2. Suppose ( ) ( )g v g v    for two adjacent faces. Then the bisector intersects 
the line generated by the common edge. 
Proof of claim 2. Denote by ( ),v  ( )v  the hyperplanes passing through face 
v  and face ,v  respectively. Since ,v v   the two hyperplanes are neither parallel nor 
coincident and intersect in a line ed  that includes the common edge. Suppose the bi-
sector does not intersect this line. Hence, the two hyperplanes ( )v  and ( )v  have 
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more than three non-aligned points in common: those in ed  and ( )(1, 1, 1)g v . Since 
they are distinct hyperplanes, this is impossible. The bisector must intersect the common 
line ed .  
To end the proof of this theorem, we distinguish between three cases: 
Case A. Equation (4) holds with strict inequality for all the adjacent edges.  
Consider the projection of the faces and the bisector onto the NPB. For each adja-
cent edge, the Pareto face and the bisector lie on the same side of the line generated by 
the edge. The projected bisector must belong to the projected face and the same is true 
on the Pareto boundary. By Theorem 3 (iii), *v  is an absolute minimum of g, and there-
fore of .g  
Case B. Equation (4) holds with strict inequality for all the adjacent edges but one, 
i.e., *( ) ( )g v g v   only for one v  adjacent to *.v  
Considering the projections onto the NPB, the bisector and the Pareto face *v  must lie 
on the same side of the lines generated by each of the adjacent edges different from .v  
Moreover, the bisector must lie on the (projected) line generated by the edge between 
the faces *v  and .v  Once again, the bisector intersects with the Pareto face *,v  and the 
theorem holds. 
Case C. Equation (4) holds with *( ) ( )g v g v   for two or more adjacent vertices .v  
The bisector must belong to all the lines generated by the edges of the adjacent faces 
for which equality holds. The bisector belongs to their intersection and thus must be 
a vertex of the face. Once again, the bisector intersects with the Pareto face *,v  and the 
theorem holds.  
4.1. The algorithm 
The following algorithm is based on Theorem 5. 
Beginning. Start from any 0v V  (for instance, the one closest to the centre in the RNS). 
Body. For the current ,kv V  compute the value ( )g v  at each adjacent vertex :v  
 If (4) holds kv  is optimal   End. 
 Otherwise move to the adjacent vertex 1kv   with the lowest value of g   Repeat 
step with 1kv  . 
End. From the optimal vertex/face   find the optimal allocation. 
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Theorem 6. The algorithm described above converges in a finite number of steps. 
Proof. Since each change of node marks a strict improvement in the objective func-
tion, the algorithm cannot cycle. Furthermore, since the number of nodes in the graph 
is finite, the algorithm will stop at the optimum in a finite number of steps.  
4.2. An example 
Consider the following evaluation matrix 
0.2 0.3 0.5
0.1 0.5 0.4
0.4 0.15 0.45
A
      
  
From the items plotted on the RNS, we obtain the graph in Fig. 5, where the light 
grey (1, 3, 2) dots indicate the items and the dark grey ones (13, 12, 23) indicate the 
intersections of the supporting lines. 
 
Fig. 5. The graph on the RNS 
Figure 6 shows the value of g  associated with each node. We start from node 13, 
then proceed to node 3 and finally stop at node 23. 
If we consider the corresponding faces on the NPB, using Fig. 7, we can verify that 
the face corresponding to node 23 contains the barycentre (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).  
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Fig. 6. Evaluating the objective function at the nodes of the graph 
 
Fig. 7. The faces on the NPB and their corresponding nodes on the graph 
The corresponding allocation matrix is 
0 0.2362 0.8947
0 0.7638 0
1 0 0.1053
X
      
 
with a common utility for the three players 0.4474. 
5. Conclusions 
In many game-theoretic contexts, the number of players matters, and, in particular, 
there is often a large increase in complexity going from a two-player to a three-player 
model. Fair division procedures are no exception in this respect. 
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The algorithm that we propose is one (but not the only possible) extension of the 
celebrated AW procedure. Using the AW procedure, the items can be conveniently ar-
ranged along the real line, according to their utility ratio. However, here we need a (pla-
nar) graph to position the items. Also, using the AW procedure, for each possible Pareto 
arrangement of the items, we only need to measure the disparity between the overall 
payoffs of the two players. Here, we need a more structured objective function to guide 
improvements to the overall allocation of goods. 
A further extension to more than three players looks possible, but not trivial. Such 
an extension should result in a graph of higher dimension, with the dimension deter-
mined by the number of players. Such an extension would also require the removal of 
the MAC assumption. It seems reasonable to make this assumption for two- or three- 
-player games with a limited number of items. However, as the number of players and 
items grows, it seems natural that at least one player has no interest in one of the disputed 
goods. 
Also, the same setting and graph can be used to find other optimal fair allocations. 
Very recently, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4] established the equivalence, for any num-
ber of players, between the Nash Bargaining and competitive equilibrium under equiv-
alent income (CEEI) solutions, and have shown that this exhibits several desirable prop-
erties that the PO-EQ allocation fails to satisfy. Furthermore, Bogomolnaia et al. [5] 
explored an interesting setting where the objects to be distributed may be goods for 
some players and “bads” for others. Finding what becomes of the IPS and the RNS in 
such a new setting is a challenging enterprise. 
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